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ABSTRACT 
Analysis of the HSEES Chemical Incident Database Using Data and Text Mining 
Methodologies. (May 2011) 
Mahdiyati, B.S., Institut Teknologi Bandung 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. M. Sam Mannan 
 
 
Chemical incidents can be prevented or mitigated by improving safety performance and 
implementing the lessons learned from past incidents. Despite some limitations in the 
range of information they provide, chemical incident databases can be utilized as 
sources of lessons learned from incidents by evaluating patterns and relationships that 
exist between the data variables. Much of the previous research focused on studying 
the causal factors of incidents; hence, this research analyzes the chemical incidents 
from both the causal and consequence elements of the incidents.  
A subset of incidents data reported to the Hazardous Substance Emergency Events 
Surveillance (HSEES) chemical incident database from 2002-2006 was analyzed using 
data mining and text mining methodologies. Both methodologies were performed with 
the aid of STATISTICA™ software. The analysis studied 12,737 chemical process 
related incidents and extracted descriptions of incidents in free-text data format from 
3,316 incident reports. The structured data was analyzed using data mining tools such 
as classification and regression trees, association rules, and cluster analysis. The 
unstructured data (textual data) was transformed into structured data using text mining, 
and subsequently analyzed further using data mining tools such as, feature selections 
and cluster analysis.   
The data mining analysis demonstrated that this technique can be used in estimating 
the incident severity based on input variables of release quantity and distance between 
victims and source of release. Using the subset data of ammonia release, the 
classification and regression tree produced 23 final nodes. Each of the final nodes 
corresponded to a range of release quantity and, of distance between victims and 
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source of release. For each node, the severity of injury was estimated from the 
observed severity scores‟ average. The association rule identified the conditional 
probability for incidents involving piping, chlorine, ammonia, and benzene in the value of 
0.19, 0.04, 0.12, and 0.04 respectively. The text mining was utilized successfully to 
generate elements of incidents that can be used in developing incident scenarios. Also, 
the research has identified information gaps in the HSEES database that can be 
improved to enhance future data analysis. The findings from data mining and text 
mining should then be used to modify or revise design, operation, emergency response 
planning or other management strategies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The chemical process industries want to improve their safety performance due to an 
increase in safety awareness and the better understanding of the risks that pertain to 
the process industry activities. One of the ways to improve safety performance in the 
industry is to monitor the lagging and leading indicators in order to evaluate the present 
state of chemical incidents and predict their tendencies in the near future.  Examples of 
lagging indicators include number of incidents, number of victims, number and type of 
equipment failure, number of hazardous substance spill, lost work days, etc.  
The U.S. has several chemical incident databases that have been established to 
monitor lagging indicators, maintain incident records and reduce the effect of incidents, 
both onsite and offsite. The data collected by these chemical incident databases are 
then analyzed to obtain useful information. The most typical analysis is trend analysis 
using statistics where a single variable is usually plotted against a period of time. While 
trend analysis can provide a good visualization of incident tendencies and a guide for 
prioritizing the focus of improvements, a more comprehensive analysis that includes 
multiple variables can be performed in order to get more benefit from the data.  
The lessons learned from an incident should be used to modify or revise design, 
operation, maintenance, emergency response planning, and other management 
strategies. Through thorough investigation, the root causes and lessons learned from 
incidents can be extracted, and implemented to improve the safety of the industrial 
processes. However, it is neither efficient nor effective to investigate all incidents. 
Therefore, a comprehensive analysis on the chemical incident needs to be performed.  
 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 
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This analysis should provide general information about chemical incident trends as well 
as specific information that indicate types of incidents that need immediate attention 
and follow up. 
 
1.2 Motivation  
As shown in Figure 1 (MKOPSC, 2009), the US has numerous chemical incident 
databases such as the Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance 
(HSEES), Risk Management Plan (RMP), Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), National Response Center (NRC), Department of 
Transportation (DOT) - Hazardous Materials Information and Resource System 
(HMIRS) and others. Each of the databases was established to serve different purposes 
and cover different areas; therefore information contained in each database varies from 
one to another.  
The HSEES database collected incidents which occurred in fixed facilities, during 
transportation activities, and in areas other than the industrial facilities. This database 
gathered many details about the adverse effects of incidents on human health. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers the RMP database which compiles 
incidents involving regulated chemicals above a certain threshold quantity in a number 
of covered processes in 5 years time period. The RMP data covers a wide range of 
information including the onsite and offsite impacts of the incidents. 
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Figure 1: Coverage of several chemical incident databases in the U.S.  
 
The OSHA chemical incidents database collects work-related incidents which include a 
high number of hard hat safety type incidents. The HMIRS chemical incident database 
was established to meet the federal hazardous material transportation regulation. All 
modes of transportation except for pipeline and bulk marine transportation are covered 
by the HMIRS database. The process industry should take advantage of these chemical 
incident databases because the incident data contains useful information on incident 
prevention and mitigation.  
The effort to collect information on incidents and learn from the mistakes made by 
others has been considered a good industrial practice. After the Flixborough 
catastrophe incident in the UK occurred in 1970, the Institution of Chemical Engineers 
(IChemE) published the Loss Prevention Bulletin to share incident case studies and 
lessons learned from each of them. There were many other similar efforts established 
by safety professionals around the globe. Since then, a steady continuous improvement 
in industrial safety has been observed, and this has been complemented by the 
implementation of a proper safety management system (Jones et al., 1999). 
HSEES
HMIRSOSHA
RMP
Fixed facility Transportation
Railroad, Highway, 
Pipeline, Waterways
Residence areas 
Agricultural areas 
Public areas
Industry
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Based on the availability of chemical incident database and their evident benefits, this 
research has been tailored to explore the HSEES database by analyzing relationships 
between its variables. These variables will be selected based on their potential for 
producing information that can be used as a reference for improving safety performance 
in general and, specifically in risk reduction efforts. The perimeters of the analysis 
obtained from the chemical incident databases are subject to the shortcomings that 
exist in the databases (Mannan et al., 1999). Therefore, the analyses should be 
generated as prudent work to ensure that these variables are translated into meaningful 
information and furthermore, knowledge.     
 
1.3 Background: Chemical Incident Analysis 
There has been various analysis and research conducted on chemical incident 
databases by either individuals or organizations. The most common methodologies 
were statistical analysis. Much of the research performed statistical analysis to chemical 
incident data (Uth, 1999; Wakakura & Iiduka, 1999; ATSDR, 2006; Welles et al., 2009) 
and more recent research has used data mining analysis.  
The ATSDR published an annual report on its website on the chemical incidents 
collected by HSEES. The report contained elaborate statistical analysis on incidents 
that occurred in different facilities and produced analysis describing the number of 
chemicals released, the number of victims, the distribution of victims based on their 
age, sex, occupation, etc, the number of injuries and fatalities based on the severity and 
type of injuries, and other information regarding response and decontamination 
activities (ATSDR, 2004). The findings on the annual report were disseminated to health 
and safety professionals, emergency responders, and other parties.  
The New York HSEES state agency conducted a state-specific statistical analysis on 
incident data. Several patterns were found such as carbon monoxide poisoning due to 
underground utility cable fires and significant mercury spills in schools and other public 
areas. Partnering with the Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), the New 
York HSEES system has provided the state incident data, lessons learned and case 
5 
 
studies as inputs for the committees. Through analysis, the New York HSEES 
discerned an increasing number of clandestine drug labs and supplied law enforcement, 
fire fighters, and other related parties with information about the hazards posed by 
these labs, which helped them in preparing their response plans and actions (Welles et 
al., 2009).   
The Mary Kay O‟Connor Process Safety Center has published several papers and 
produced a number of theses and dissertations on chemical incident data analysis 
using various databases. A subset of HSEES data related to the chemical process from 
2002 to 2004 was analyzed using data mining tools such as cluster analysis, decision 
tree and logistic regression, and text mining tools. In this research, the cluster analysis 
produced 3 clusters each of which had 4 discernable characteristics of the type of 
industry, contributing factors, the state where the release occurred, and the number of 
chemicals released.  
Text mining was used to analyze the variable which describes a brief summary of each 
incident. The text mining results were used as input for cluster analysis and produced 
clusters that provided a better description of the incidents compared to the previous 
cluster analysis using non textual data. A decision tree model was used to predict the 
outcome of the incidents and the generated model was able to correctly predict 
incidents that resulted in injury with 16% accuracy. The decision tree analysis was 
performed using text inputs. The results showed that the model had the ability to predict 
incidents with injury up to 57% accuracy. Logistic regression using data and text input 
was performed to predict the likelihood of an injury occurring given certain variables 
were present in the data. The prediction model showed and quantified that particular 
contributing factors, chemicals and industries significantly increased the likelihood of 
injuries occurring (Veltman, 2008). 
A subset of the NRC incident data was analyzed using two data mining techniques; 
decision tree analysis and association rules. The decision tree technique was applied to 
describe and classify incident data that led to fires or explosions and injuries as 
consequences of releases. The association rule technique was applied to produce lift 
values for the variables type of equipment and type of chemicals involved in the 
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incidents. The lift values were proposed to be used as a factor to update the equipment 
failure probability values so they are chemical-specific (Anand, 2005). 
Another research project used a subset of HSEES data from 2000 to 2004 to generate 
trend analysis using many different variables. The analysis was performed by 
classifying the incidents into two categories: system interruption events and system 
comparison events. This research also used a scaling ratio to estimate the national 
incident statistics based on the amount of HSEES data (Obidullah, 2006).  
A subset of the RMP data was studied with the objective of generating trend analysis for 
frequently released chemicals and evaluating the limitations of the database. The study 
focused on potential improvements to the database by relating the failure rate obtained 
from the RMP database to an existing failure rate database, such as Offshore Reliability 
Data (OREDA), and including factors such as hazard information for the chemicals 
released and analytical information or lessons learned from the incidents (Al-Qurashi, 
2000).  
Text mining was performed using the Major Accidents Reporting System (MARS), a 
chemical incident database created by the European Union member countries to 
produce clusters of incidents.  The analysis produced importance plots of variables that 
can predict incidents with particular elements (the dependent variable) using 
independent variables of other elements of the incidents. The importance plots showed 
the F-values of each predictor to evaluate their significance in predicting the dependent 
variable. The results from the text mining were also used to cluster the incident data to 
observe their natural clusters. Furthermore, the clusters observed were applied to 
develop the chemical incident taxonomy that would later be used in the active and 
knowledge-based incident retrieval system (Khan, 2010).   
An analysis of the narrative text analysis was performed with the Kentucky tractor 
fatality reports, producing likelihood values for incidents with certain outcomes such as 
death at the scene or fatally crushed. The likelihood of an incident‟s outcome was 
modeled using logistic regression and predictor variables such as tractor equipment 
(front-end loaders, counterweight, roll-over protective structure), environmental 
conditions (muddy terrains), victims‟ conditions (thrown away, overturn), tractors‟ 
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mechanical factors (brakes, seat belt), and incident location (slope, flat terrain). This 
research found that the likelihood of being crushed by a tractor as a consequence of a 
tractor incident increased by a factor of 8.8 and 6.2 respectively for incidents where the 
tractor rolled over and the tractor was operating on sloped areas. While the likelihood of 
an incident resulting in death at the scene increased by a factor of 9.1for tractor 
operations equipped with front-end loaders (Bunn et al., 2008).   
The HSEES and RMP were also used to generate annual exceedance frequencies 
using data on the number of fatalities or injuries. Linear regression was performed to 
evaluate the relationship between predictor variables such as the number of major 
injuries, minor injuries, and evacuations, and the number of fatalities that occurred. The 
resulting regression equation showed that the number of fatalities was strongly 
influenced by the number of lower consequence events; the existence of incidents with 
fatalities indicated the existence of a high number of lower consequence events, such 
as injuries and evacuations (Prem et al., 2010). 
From the literature review, it can be observed that previous studies on chemical incident 
data have mainly focused on trend analyses of a single variable of the chemical incident 
database. Much of the previous research performed multivariate analysis using data 
mining methodology and variables that described the cause of the incidents. Many 
however, did not use variables that describe the consequence of the incidents such as 
severity. Therefore, this research tried to improve the multivariate analysis by including 
variables that describe the severity experienced by the victims. This research also 
studied the relationship between the consequence and the causal factors of incidents 
such as the quantity of release and the severity of the incident in terms of injury or 
fatality.  
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1.4 Objectives  
The research objectives are to provide information from past incidents which can be 
used as a basis for developing recommendations to improve safety performance in the 
industry. In order to generate such information, this research has been tailored:  
 To obtain the trend analysis of chemical incidents reported to the HSEES 
database from 2002 to 2006 by evaluating the following variables: 
 Number of incidents and types of incidental releases 
 Causal factors such as: contributing causes, type and amount of 
chemical released 
 Consequence factors such as: number and type of injuries, number of 
fatalities  
 To investigate the relationship between the quantity of the chemicals released 
and the severity of the consequences, in respect to adverse health effects. 
 To produce pattern analysis that identifies and quantifies the association 
between two or more variables that describes the type of releases, equipment 
and chemicals. 
 To perform text mining on the HSEES incident comment variable 
 To propose recommendations to improve the current incident collection system 
in order to produce better analysis that benefits process safety. 
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2. INCIDENT DATABASE 
 
This research selected the Hazardous Substance Emergency Events Surveillance 
(HSEES) database for analysis because it was considered the most comprehensive 
and reliable database due to its active reporting system and relatively wide range of 
data collected which covers up to 16 states in the US. 
 
2.1 HSEES Chemical Incident Database 
The HSEES database was created and managed by the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry (ATSDR) of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) with the objective of collecting incident data, particularly data that describes the 
adverse health effects of incidents due to chemical releases, in terms of the morbidity 
and mortality experienced by the workers, emergency responders and general public 
(ATSDR, 2004). This surveillance system was established in 1993 and was ended in 
2010 due to funding related issues. HSEES was replaced by another chemical incident 
database called the National Toxic Substances Incident Program (NTSIP) in 2010. 
Fifteen states participated in HSEES annually from 2002 to 2005 and 14 states 
participated in 2006. The states which consistently participated throughout the active 
years of HSEES were Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. In 2010, before 
HSEES data collection ended, the state participation went down to 7. 
The flow of information on incidents reported to the HSEES chemical incident data 
collection system is shown in Figure 2 (MKOPSC, 2009). The health department of 
each participating state was expected to report the incidents through a web-based 
collection system within 48 hours after the incident had occurred. 
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Figure 2: Information flow of the incidents reported to HSEES system 
 
An incident was reported to HSEES if there was an uncontrolled or illegal hazardous 
substance release or if there was the threat of a hazardous substance release other 
than petroleum, where more than 10 lbs or 1 gallon was released. If no hazardous 
substance was released, the incident must still be reported to HSEES in the event that 
an evacuation, order for sheltering in place or other public health precaution was put 
into place. 
The HSEES is a massive chemical incident database system that has more than 100 
variables and 120,145 incident reports collected from 1993-2006. Several examples of 
information that is described in the HSEES variables are as follows: 
 Event identification number and notification information. 
 Description of the incident: date, time, location, type of industry, equipment, 
contributing factors, chemicals, physical state of the release, quantity of the 
chemical released, etc. 
 Description of the victims: number of injuries and fatalities, type of injuries, 
severity of injuries, location where victims were found, personal protection 
equipment worn by the victims, number of people evacuated, etc.  
Industry Public State  Agencies Hospitals
State HSEES
ATSDR
Private Data
First responder 
report
Public Data
News
National Response Center 
(NRC)
Department of 
Transportation 
(DOT)
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 Potential community exposure: population within ¼, ½, 1 mile from the incident 
area, land use information. 
 Response to and termination of the incident. 
Due to the broad range of incident collected by HSEES, as shown in Figure 3, this study 
focuses on a particular segment of the incident data which is pertinent to chemical 
process incidents. This segmented data limits the scope of the analysis to 12,737 
incident reports. 
 
 
Figure 3: Subset data of HSEES used in the research 
 
The HSEES data used in this analysis was extracted from a Microsoft Access database. 
The chemical incident database was organized in a relational table system, where 
tables containing event or incident information, chemicals, and victims‟ descriptions can 
be linked using a unique identification key. Table 1 shows a snapshot of the chemical 
incident database with several examples of variables used in this research. 
Radiological
Chemical
Medical 
materials
Biological
Fixed facility
Transportation
Petrochemical 
refinery
Plastics, synthetics 
and resins
Chemical industry
Private 
Data
Public areas
Agricultural areas
Residential areas
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Table 1: HSEES chemical incident database 
Event 
ID 
Date Substance name 
Release 
quantity  (lbs) 
Quantity 
category 
Victims 
Equipment/ 
Facility 
Release Type Industry 
A 01/18/2002 Diphenyl 257 100 - 999 11 
Ancillary process 
equipment 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Petroleum refining 
B 01/18/2002 Hydrogen sulfide 100 100  -  999 16 Dump/waste area 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Pulp, paper, & 
paperboard mills 
C 02/11/2002 Ammonia 180 100  -  999 0 Process vessel 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
D 02/05/2002 Sulfuric Acid 5000 1000  -  9,999 0 Process vessel 
 
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
E 03/02/2002 Benzenesulfonyl hydrazide 245 100  -  999 0 Process vessel 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Plastics, synthetics, 
& resins 
F 03/12/2002 Methyl Mercaptan 213 100  -  999 0 Process vessel 
 
Pulp, paper, & 
paperboard mills 
G 03/29/2002 Hydrogen sulfide 113 100  -  999 0 Process vessel 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Pulp, paper, & 
paperboard mills 
H 04/11/2002 Ammonia 30,000 10,000  -  99,999 0 
Ancillary process 
equipment  
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
I 04/06/2002 Methyl Mercaptan 126 100  -  999 0 Process vessel 
 
Pulp, paper, & 
paperboard mills 
J 05/09/2002 Ethyl acrylate 775 100  -  999 0 Process vessel 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Miscellaneous 
fabricated metal 
products 
K 08/04/2002 tert-Butyl alcohol 920 100  -  999 0 
Storage above 
ground 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
L 08/07/2002 Ammonia 339 100  -  999 0 Process vessel 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
M 08/19/2002 Sodium Hydroxide 1200 1000  -  9,999 0 
Storage above 
ground 
Spill 
Miscellaneous 
plastics products 
N 08/30/2002 XYLENOL 5800 1000  -  9,999 0 
Storage above 
ground 
Spill 
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
O 08/30/2002 BENZENE 26 10  -  99 0 Process vessel 
Volatilization/     
aerosolized 
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
P 09/09/2002 ACETONE 175 100  -  999 0 Process vessel Explosion 
Industrial & misc 
chemicals 
Q 09/19/2002 Methylene Chloride 2000 1000  -  9,999 0 Piping 
 
Miscellaneous 
plastics products 
         
1
2
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Research Methodology  
This research analyzed the HSEES database using data and text mining algorithms as 
shown in Figure 4. The first step of the data analysis is data and variable selection. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the analysis focuses on a subset of HSEES data 
pertinent to incidents which occurred inside industrial facilities. The selections of the 
variables were made to include the causal factors and consequence of the incidents 
and other relevant information. The incident reports containing sparse data were 
omitted.  
Once the data has been selected, an exploratory analysis was performed using 
statistical means. Selected variables were plotted and observed to get the feel of the 
data. Then, findings from data exploration step were used as a reference in conducting 
the data and text mining process.   
 
 
Figure 4: Research methodology 
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Prior to conducting data mining, the selected data must undergo some preparation 
which involved cleaning the data of duplicate entries and formatting the data attributes. 
Finally, the data was analyzed using data mining tools such as cluster analysis, 
association rule, and classification and regression tree (CRT). The clustering process 
focuses on determining if the computed groupings have meaningful values and explicit 
characteristics (Cerrito, 2006). The association rule identifies patterns of events which 
attributes are associated. The pattern values were then compared with the patterns 
found in previous research. The decision tree was performed to evaluate the 
relationship between a numbers of predictor variables that determine the severity of an 
incident. 
Text mining was performed to analyze the textual data (unstructured data). HSEES has 
a variable called “comment” that contains brief description of the incidents and often 
provides information that the other variables (structured data) do not. Therefore, there is 
an opportunity to explore the textual data in order to obtain valuable information. A 
detailed explanation on data and text mining is given in the following sections. 
 
3.2 Data Mining 
Data mining is used as a tool to analyze the HSEES database due to its ability to 
compute large data, perform multivariate analysis and produce predictive models. Data 
mining is commonly used to identify patterns, associations or relationships in the data 
variables (Edelstein, 1999). One of the benefits of using data mining is that relationships 
or patterns that are neither obvious nor noticeable can be identified.   
 
3.2.1 Cluster Analysis 
Cluster analysis is an unsupervised data mining algorithm where the dependent 
variable is not specified (Cerrito, 2006). The clustering focuses on grouping members 
with similar attributes and finding meaningful clusters that are distinctive of each other. 
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The interpretation of the clusters is a subjective process, depending on the interest and 
perspective of the analyst. The clustering of HSEES data was performed to produce 
meaningful groups of incidents that share similar characteristics. The incident groups 
can then be used to describe typical incidents reported to HSEES.    
The idea behind cluster analysis is to separate data points into groups or clusters so the 
total variation among the incident reports is minimized within each group and 
maximized between groups. The degree of variation is evaluated using the Euclidian 
distance shown in Equation 1. Using the geometric distance of each case in the multi 
variable space as the objective function, the clusters are optimized to minimize the 
distance between members in each cluster and to maximize the distance between 
clusters (Hand et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
k-means clustering was selected for the analysis because it can handle data larger than 
250 points. In k-means clustering, the user can assign a k-number of clusters and 
observe the clusters profile to determine whether the clusters have meaning. Another 
way to perform k-means clustering is to let the software optimize the number of clusters, 
given the range of cluster set by the users.  
k-means clustering analysis is typically used for continuous variables, however it can 
also process categorical variables in which all distances are binary (0 or 1). The 
variable is assigned 0 when the attribute of the data point is the same as the attribute 
with the highest frequency in a cluster, otherwise it will be assigned 1 (Nisbet et al., 
2009). Once the number of clusters is optimized, the profile of each cluster should be 
evaluated to identify their characteristics and to determine whether the clusters are 
reasonable (Cerrito, 2006).  
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3.2.2 Association Rule 
The association rule is a data mining tool used for extracting patterns and associations 
between the variables. The association rule, first known as the market basket analysis, 
was used to identify items that customers bought together frequently. These purchasing 
patterns were then used as considerations for marketing strategies such as creating 
specials or bundling option for multiple items, etc.                                            
Association rules obtained the patterns by identifying the occurrences of two or more 
variable attributes and their relative frequency of occurrence. The set of the association 
rules consists of a left-hand side proposition (the antecedent) and a right-hand side 
proposition (the consequent), which are presented using the following form: 
“If event A occurs, then B occurs with a probability of x, and this pair of events occurs 
with a probability of y in all of the events.” 
The parameters that quantify the rule set are x and y, which are the confidence and 
support, respectively. Further expression and explanations of the parameters, are given 
as follows: 
 The support value is computed as the joint probability or relative frequency of events 
A and B occurring simultaneously.  
        
                                                    
                      
        
 
 The confidence value is the conditional probability of event B occurring, given event 
A has occurred. It indicates the ratio of the probability of the antecedent (A) and the 
consequence (B) occurring simultaneously with the probability of the antecedent (A). 
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 The lift value is a measure of the likelihood of B occurring given A has occurred 
relative to the likelihood of B occurring independently.  
           
          
                         
  
       
    
    
 
 
3.2.3 Classification and Regression Trees 
A classification and regression tree (CRT) is a data mining algorithm that is used to 
classify or estimate a dependent variable based on predictor variables, which either can 
be categorical or continuous. The relationship between the variables is organized into a 
tree-like structure where the root node is split into two or more branches. Each branch 
represents classes or ranges of the root node. The splitting process continues until 
certain stopping rules are satisfied (Nisbet et al., 2009). The final nodes of the CRT are 
called the terminal nodes.     
CRT is used to study the relationship between the predictor variables and the 
dependent variable because of its ability to perform piecewise regressions and 
produces easy to understand results. The piecewise regression accommodates the 
presumption that not all incidents are the same but at the same time it attempts to 
estimate the outcome using predictor variables. The objective of the CRT is to partition 
the data at a point (node), so it produces subsequent branches that fit the piece 
regressions with minimum error or that give a maximum R-squared value.  
The splitting criterion evaluates the reduction in the distribution of the dependent 
variable between subsequent node and the root node (Matignon, 2007). There are two 
steps in the splitting process, which are determining the best split for each input variable 
and choosing the best split that considers the multiple input variables. The node where 
the splitting begins is selected based on its improvement of predictive accuracy, which 
is measured by node impurity (Statsoft, 2008). For regression cases, a least squared 
deviation criterion is applied to measure node impurity. The least squared deviation is 
computed as: 
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where, Nw(t) is the weighted number of cases in node t, wi is the value of weighting 
variable for case i, fi is the value of frequency variable, yi is the value of response 
variable, and y(t) is the weighted mean for node t.  
The stopping rule is an important parameter in constructing the tree because the size of 
the tree affects the interpretation greatly. A tree that is too small results in an unreliable 
estimate, while a tree that is too large results in overfitting the data (Matignon, 2007). 
The stopping rules used in this research is prune on variance, which means that the 
tree will stop splitting when the variance of the current tree is better than the tree with 
further splits. 
Incident severity is a function of many different factors, such as quantity of release, 
weather conditions, properties of the chemicals released, distance of victims in respect 
to the source of release, susceptibility of the people, and other factors. Hence, it cannot 
be expressed using a simple model. However, it is still of interest to study how 
significant several factors, such as release quantity and distance of victims in respect to 
the source of release, affect the severity of incidents. Complex factors, such as 
interaction between variables or the domino effect, may not be presented well in the 
tree model.  
 
3.3 Text Mining 
Text mining is a process of analyzing textual data (unstructured data), by extracting 
meaningful numeric indices from the text. The transformation from text data to numeric 
indices allows the data to be processed further using data mining algorithms (Statsoft, 
2008). The information from text data can be used to derive summaries for the words 
contained in the documents or the summaries of the documents (Nisbet et al., 2009).  
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The steps of text mining are shown in Figure 5 and further explanations of each step 
are provided in the following sections.  
 
 
Figure 5: Text mining algorithm 
 
3.3.1 Preparation of Text Data 
Before applying text mining, there are several steps to be performed in order to prepare 
the text data. The following steps reduce and filter the existing words in the incident 
reports: 
 Creating a stop words list  
Stop words are considered non-essential words that do not help in distinguishing 
the information that pertains to this work. Therefore, these words need to be 
excluded from the indexing process. Example of English stop words are words 
such as conjunctives, articles, auxiliary verbs, prepositions, etc. This research 
Numeric indices of 
the text is used as 
inputs for data mining 
process.
Incident 
reports 
 Essential words from incident description
 181 words were extracted
 Query HSEES text inputs
 Used 3316 documents
Singular value decomposition
 Transformation of  raw word 
f requencies 
 Inverse document f requency (idf )
 M x N, Words by Document matrix
 Produce a sparse matrix
 
0.389 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0.593 ⋯ 0
  
 Compressing the matrix using SVD
 Reducing the dimensional space
 Deleting noisier information
Word Raw Freq Doc Freq
Leak 712 …
Valve 560 …
Ammonia 343 …
Broke 92 …
Acid 62 …
Boiler 61 …
Blew 45 …
… … …
 
1 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
2 ⋯ 0
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edited the Statistica built-in English stop words list to include additional non-
essential words observed in the incident descriptions. The examples of the stop 
words are incident, event, notification, release, response, caller, etc shown in 
Appendix.    
 
 Creating a start words list  
Start words lists are lists of words that give significant meaning to the analysis, 
and in this case are the opposite of the stop words lists. Start words list can be 
created to ensure that the essential or particular words of interest are included in 
the indexing process. This research did not use a start words list and used stop 
words list to extract more words from the document.   
 
 Stemming and identifying phrases and synonyms  
Stemming is a data preparation step for reducing words to their roots so that 
different grammatical forms of a word are identified and treated as the same 
word. Phrases and synonyms of the stop words can be specified so that they 
are excluded from the indexing process as well. The phrases used in this text 
mining are shown in Appendix.  
 
3.3.2 Indexing and Transforming Word Frequencies  
The words from the documents (incident reports) were extracted and each of the 
selected word frequencies was computed, as shown in Table 2. The full list of extracted 
words is shown in Appendix. In general, the raw word frequencies can be used as a 
parameter that reflects how salient a word is in every document. However, the 
importance of the word itself cannot be determined based on its frequency alone, 
therefore the word frequencies need to be transformed into a form that accounts for 
relative importance of the word in all of the documents.  
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Table 2: Words extracted using inverse document frequencies 
Word-i Word Frequency 
1 Leak 712 
2 Valve 560 
3 Line 392 
4 Ammonia 343 
5 Failure 338 
6 Flare 329 
7 Process 285 
… … … 
… … … 
180 Broken 35 
181 Smell 34 
 
This research used inverse document frequencies because it covers both the relative 
frequencies of word occurrence and the word‟s semantic specificities in the documents. 
The inverse document frequencies (idf) transformation takes into account the relative 
document frequencies (df) of different words. This word frequencies transformation 
accounts both the specificity of the words (document frequencies) and the overall of the 
words (word frequencies) for the word i and document j respectively (Statsoft, 2008):  
 
           
                                                                 
                 
 
   
                   
  
 
Where N is the total number of documents, dfi is the document frequency for the word i. 
The formula includes dampening of words frequencies and a weighting factor to 
evaluate a word‟s relative occurrence. The weighting factor (log (N/dfi)) is valued at 0 
(minimum) if the word occurs in all documents, and valued at 1 (maximum) if the word 
only occurs in one document (Statsoft, 2008). The transformed word frequencies then 
are used in further text mining computation such as SVD calculation.  
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3.3.3 Latent Semantic Indexing  
A vector space model can be used to represent the words and documents extracted 
from the text data. Table 3 shows examples of words and documents used in this 
research. The words and documents are supposedly represented in matrix A, where the 
matrix columns correspond to the documents and the matrix rows correspond to the 
words of the text, as shown in Figure 6. Matrix A would then be normalized to produce 
matrix values shown in Figure 7. 
 
Table 3: Words and documents of HSEES incident descriptions 
Word Document 
W1: Leak D1: Flange leak occurred in a section of 4 inch pipe on the feed 
system heat exchangers.  Material released was a liquid 
with some atomized droplets, which caused the material to 
vaporize and disperse. 
W2: Tank D2: When aligning a pipe to a well, a drain valve was not closed 
completely causing release. 
W3: Pipe D3: Pressure in vessel was too high, causing ammonia to be 
released from relief valve. 
 
    
   
   
   
  
Figure 6: The 3x3 words by document matrix 
 
23 
 
 
 
    
       
   
           
  
Figure 7: The normalized matrix A 
 
The extraction of words and documents can be performed using the exact word and 
document match but also using other relevant documents that fit the context. Therefore, 
latent semantic indexing (LSI) is used to understand the semantic space of the words, 
beyond literal words matching. LSI employs vector space representation of both words 
and documents to find other documents relevant to a word (Berry & Browne, 1999). 
In the case of representing large incident text data in word and document matrix, the 
resulting matrices would be large and sparse, with many zeros showing that many 
words only appear in a few documents. Therefore, the matrix size can be compressed 
such that it still retains useful information and is more efficient in representing the words 
and documents. A matrix decomposition algorithm such as singular value 
decomposition (SVD) can be used to reduce the matrix size. 
SVD reduces the overall dimensions of the input matrix A by extracting the common 
semantic space of the data (Han & Kamber, 2006). The reduced dimensional space 
should represent the largest degree of variability between words and documents so that 
the latent semantic space that organizes the words and documents can be identified. 
Hence, singular value decomposition can determine the few underlying dimensions that 
account for most of the contents or meaning of the document and words that were 
extracted (Statsoft, 2008). 
The singular value decomposition theorem states that matrix A can be decomposed as 
follows:  
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U and V are orthogonal matrices, where UTU= I and VTV= I. S is the diagonal matrix 
with singular values. The SVD calculation consists of evaluating the eigen value and 
eigen vectors, AAT and ATA in respective. The eigen value AAT is presented as column 
V, the eigen vectors ATA is represented as column U and the singular values in S are 
calculated as the square roots of eigen values from AAT or ATA (MIT, 2002). 
Once the SVD computation has been performed, the results can be visualized using a 
scree plot. The scree plot indicated the number of components that are useful by 
locating the elbow of the plot, the point where the plot decreases smoothly and the 
singular values becomes steady. After the text data has been processed numerically, 
the data can be analyzed using common data mining tools such as cluster analysis, 
feature selections, CRT, etc. 
 
3.3.4 Feature Selection Tools  
The feature selection tool can be used to identify important predictors that have strong 
relationships to the dependent variables. This relationship is based on the presence of 
the predictors in respect to the dependent variables in all of the documents. The feature 
selection tool produces bar plots where the importance of the predictors are ranked 
based on their F-values.  
 
3.3.5 Cluster Analysis Using Text Inputs 
Cluster analysis was performed using the component scores of the words and 
documents produced by the SVD. The same cluster analysis concept explained in 
section 3.2.1 applies to the component scores. The component score can be used to 
perform cluster analysis on words that relate to each other (Raja & Tretter, 2010), and 
furthermore to evaluate the typical incidents that are reported to HSEES. The results of 
this cluster analysis will be evaluated and compared to cluster analysis without text. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The following analysis used HSEES data pertinent to chemical process incidents that 
occurred from 2002 to 2006. This subset of HSEES data was selected because it was 
relatively recent, the number of states participated were comparable and the structure 
of the reporting system during this HSEES active period was uniform. The HSEES data 
prior to this period had a slightly different format and terms used as attributes of the 
variables. 
 
4.1 Statistical Analysis  
The statistical analysis provided fundamental information of the HSEES data, focused 
the research to statistically significant variables, and helped identify patterns in the data. 
The data went through a cleaning process, where incidents related to emission 
releases, duplicate entries, and incident cases with high numbers of missing attributes 
were eliminated. The cleaning process set boundaries so the analysis only focused on 
incidents related to loss of containment that occurred in the industrial area.   
 
4.1.1 Trend Analysis  
Figure 8 shows the number of incidents that occurred from 2002 to 2006. The average 
number of chemical process related incidents that occurred from 2002 to 2006 was 
approximately 2,500 incidents per year (only include data from 15 states, only incidents 
occurring within the chemical facilities boundaries are included, petroleum-only 
incidents are excluded). Throughout this period there was an average of 15 states 
participating in HSEES incident collection system. In order to observe the tendency of 
an incident‟s occurrence, these figures need to be normalized by the number of facilities 
participating each year. However this type of information was not provided by the 
database. Assuming that the number of facilities reporting to the HSEES each year was 
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constant, it can be observed that the number of chemical process related incidents rose 
slightly. 
 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Participating states 15 15 15 15 14 
Figure 8:  Chemical process related incidents and number of participating states  
 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of major and minor injuries from 2002 to 2006. The 
HSEES severity classification was used to define major and minor injuries (HSEES 
collection form). Major injuries are defined as any incident consequence where the 
victims were transported to, admitted to and treated at a hospital, or transported to, not 
admitted to, and treated at the hospital. Minor injuries are defined as incident 
consequences, in which the victims experienced injuries within 24 hours, sought private 
physician service within 24 hours, were treated on the scene or received first-aid help. 
The number of injuries, both major and minor, reported to HSEES increased from 98 in 
2002 to 466 in 2006. The number of injuries from 2002 to 2005 was relatively steady, 
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and there was a sharp increase in reported injuries in 2006, up 150% compared to the 
previous years. These increments could be either a sign of an actual rise in the number 
of injuries, an increase in the number of facility participating in the HSEES reporting 
system or an indicator of growing safety awareness in the industries which made the 
participating facilities report more incidents to the HSEES system. In order to 
understand this observation, information on the number of facilities reporting and the 
amount of regulation changes made in this period needs to be available and accounted 
for.  
 
 
Figure 9: Number of injuries reported to HSEES in 2002 – 2006 
 
As shown in Figure 10, the number of fatalities reported to HSEES fluctuated from 5 in 
2002 to 3 in 2006. There was no obvious trend observed. The analysis can be 
enhanced using the descriptions of the incidents with fatalities. The text description can 
be analyzed using text mining to study the common factors which indicate fatalities 
(Bunn et al., 2008). 
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Figure 10: Number of fatalities reported to HSEES in 2002-2006 
 
Figure 11 shows the types of incidents reported to HSEES. The types of HSEES 
incidents were categorized based on the physical state of the chemical released such 
as vapor releases (which include vapor, gas and aerosol) and spill releases (which 
include liquid and solid). The events following the chemical release such as fire or 
explosion were also classified in the same variables as vapor and spill releases. This 
means that HSEES treats fires and explosions as causal factors for the incidents 
instead as consequences. The major type of incidents involved vapor releases, which 
consist of 79% of the total incidents, and spill releases which consist of 19% of the total 
incidents.  Fire and explosion releases each have slightly less than 1% of the total 
number of incidents.  
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Figure 11: Types of incidents reported to HSEES 
 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of the contributing causes of the incidents reported to 
HSEES. Equipment failure was the mode of immediate contributing causes, comprising 
63% of the total number of incidents, followed by human error at 15%, deliberate 
damage at 14%, natural disaster at 4% and unknown and others at less than 5%. The 
current analysis can be further enhanced by using the text comment variable, which 
provides a succinct description of the incidents. The utilization of text comments can 
produce analysis of the types of releases, equipment where the release came from and 
the process involved in the incidents.   
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Figure 12: Contributing causes reported to HSEES 
 
Figure 13 shows the Pareto chart of the ten chemicals frequently released. The release 
of these chemicals constituted about 35% of the total incidents used in this research. 
The majority of the incidents involved Ammonia release, approximately 1,536 incidents 
or 12% of the total number of incidents.  Incidents involving Benzene, Chlorine, Freon 
and Vinyl Chloride followed at 516, 479, 378 and 347 incidents, or 4%, 3.8%, 35 and 
2.7% of the total number of incidents, respectively. The remaining chemicals were 
released in a relatively low numbers of incidents and could not all be mentioned due to 
the hundreds of variety of chemicals involved.  
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Figure 13: Chemicals frequently reported to HSEES in 2002-2006 
 
Figure 14 shows the ratios between the number of victims and the number of incidents 
derived from Figure 13.  Chlorine had the highest ratio of number of victims to number 
of incidents at 0.5, which translated to 1 victim for every 2 Chlorine-related incidents. 
Ammonia had a ratio of 0.26 which translated to 1 victim for every 4 Ammonia-related 
incidents. Similar ratios for Hydrogen sulfide, Freon and Mercury are 0.19, 0.18, and 
0.05 respectively.  
This ratio however cannot be used directly as a measure of injury rate for each 
chemical because there are several factors that influence the consequence of incidents, 
such as the chemical dose exposed to the victims, including both concentration and 
time of exposure, the toxicity of the chemicals, personal protection equipment worn by 
the victims, etc. 
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Figure 14: The ratio of the numbers of victims and the number of incidents 
 
The previous analysis can be enhanced using information about the source of the 
release, either the type of process or the type of equipment. However, HSEES did not 
collect this type of information. This can be added to points of consideration for 
developing recommendations on ways to improve chemical incident databases.  
The variable „quantity of chemicals released‟ was distributed through a large range of 
quantities due to the large variety in the quantities reported to HSEES and the 
uncertainty of this variable.  Figure 15 shows the distribution of the release quantity and 
the number of victims for each quantity category. The most common release quantity 
was in the range of 100 to 999 lbs, where 3,591 incidents, approximately 28% of the 
total number of incidents, were reported in this category. The release quantity category 
of 10 to 99 lbs and 1,000 to 9,999 lbs, approximately 21% and 18% of the total number 
of incidents reported, were also reported among the frequently released quantities. 
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Figure 15: Distribution of the release quantity in 2002-2006 
 
Figure 16 shows the ratios between the numbers of victims and the number of incidents 
for each release quantity category derived from Figure 15. The incidents where a 
chemical was released under a quantity of less than 1 lb had the highest number of 
victims over number of incidents ratio. It is interesting to consider the fact that HSEES 
did not require chemical released less than 10 lbs or 1 gallon to be reported; however 
the analysis showed a relatively high number of incidents and number of victims 
reported in this category. This may indicate that the industry and the public in general 
were becoming more conscious about the importance of reporting incidents regardless 
of the incident reporting criteria.  
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Figure 16: Ratio of number of victims and number of incidents in HSEES incidents 
 
The next highest ratios of number of victims over number of incidents were incidents 
with chemical releases in quantities of 1 to 9 lbs, 10,000 to 99,999 lbs, and other 
categories. In order to evaluate how the quantities of the chemicals released influences 
the outcome of the incidents, severity factors need to be included in the analysis. Such 
analysis will be discussed in the next section.      
 
4.1.2 Relationship between Release Quantity and Severity of Incidents   
The research aims at studying the relationship between the quantities of the chemical 
released and the severity of injury of incidents. Provided that other variables are 
comparable, it is assumed that the quantity of chemical released is proportional to the 
incident consequences in terms of the adverse effects on human health, involving the 
number of injuries or fatalities. Thus, the HSEES severity data was used to justify this 
assumption. The types of severity of health effects of the incidents reported to HSEES 
were given in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Severity of health effects of the incidents reported to HSEES 
Severity Translation Severity Index 
Treated on the scene or received first-aid  Minor injury 0.1 
Observation at the hospital, no treatment Minor injury 1 
Injuries within 24 hours, reported by officials Minor injury 1 
Seen by private physician within 24 hours Minor injury 1 
Unknown Minor injury 1 
Treated at the hospital, not admitted Major injury 10 
Treated at the hospital, admitted Major injury 50 
Death on scene or after arrival at the hospital Fatality 100 
 
The severities of the incidents were evaluated based on a scoring system, which gave 
quantification to the consequences of the incidents (MKOPSC, 2006). The scoring 
system does not reflect the value of life or injury but merely helps differentiate the 
significance of each type of incident. Figure 17 shows the relationship between the 
quantity of the release and the severity of the consequence of the incidents, which was 
normalized by the number of respective incidents.  
With the assumption that all incidents have comparable causal factors, chemicals and 
conditions, it can be presumed that an incident with a higher release quantity would 
have a higher severity score. However, the incidents where chemicals were released 
under the category of < 1 lb have the highest normalized severity score, followed by the 
incidents releasing chemicals under the category 1 to 9 lbs. This indicates that causal 
factors such as the dose exposed to the victims, the distance of the victims from the 
source of release, the type of personal protection equipment (PPE) worn by the victims 
and other factors affect the outcome of the incidents. This finding can be used to justify 
the importance of in-depth incident investigations into incidents with high severity 
scores. A further study of the relationship between the release quantity and the severity 
of the incident‟s consequence is presented in section 4.2.3. 
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Figure 17: Severity score of the incidents based on the release quantity 
 
4.2 Data Mining Results  
Data mining is a method used to analyze large data, using multivariate analysis to 
discover patterns, associations or relationships between variables in the data. There are 
several data mining techniques used in this research such as cluster analysis and the 
association rule, each of which will be further explained in the following sections. All the 
data mining analysis was performed with the aid of STATISTICATM data mining 
software. 
 
4.2.1 Cluster Analysis Results  
The cluster analysis was performed using several combinations of variables to produce 
meaningful clusters. The clusters shown in the following figures were generated using 
four variables that describe: 1) chemicals released, 2) physical state of the chemicals 
released, 3) equipment or area involved in the incidents and 4) industry, where the 
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incident occurred. Through iteration, the cluster analysis produced 2 clusters with 
attributes shown in Figures 18 through 20. The generated clusters were not completely 
discernable from one another, because all attributes can be found in each cluster. 
However, the clusters can still be differentiated from each other by evaluating and 
comparing their major attributes.  
Figure 18 shows the incident data segmented based on the equipment involved in the 
respective incident. Incidents included in cluster 1 (shown in blue) can be characterized 
as incidents where the chemical was released from piping. Incidents involving piping 
consists of 52% of the total incidents in cluster 1. Incidents included in cluster 2 (shown 
in red) primarily reported ancillary process equipment and process vessels as the 
source of the chemical release. Both of these pieces of equipment consist of 65.7% and 
28.6% of the total incidents in cluster 2.  
 
 
Figure 18: Clusters viewed from the perspective of equipment involved 
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Figure 19 shows the segmented incidents viewed from the perspective of the physical 
state of the chemicals released. Incidents grouped as cluster 1 (shown in blue) primarily 
released chemicals in their liquid phase, whereas spill releases consist of 50% of the 
total incidents in this cluster. Incidents in cluster 1 also have a number of vapor releases 
which consist of 40% of the total incidents included in this cluster. In comparison, 90% 
of incidents grouped in cluster 2 involved chemicals released in a vapor state. Based on 
the clustering, it can be concluded that incidents in cluster 1 released chemicals in their 
liquid state while incidents in cluster 2 released chemicals in their vapor state.  
 
 
Figure 19: Clusters viewed from the physical state of the chemicals released 
 
Figure 20 shows the segmented incidents viewed from the industry where it occurred. 
Segmenting the incidents using this variable did not give discernable clusters because 
comparable composition of the attributes was observed for both clusters.   
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Figure 20: Clusters based on industry type 
 
The incidents were also segmented using a variable that describes the chemical 
released. The frequency graph cannot be generated because there were too many 
chemicals covered in the analysis.  
The significance of clustering is that one can expect a certain scenario by having 
information on one or more variables of an incident. In this case, the cluster analysis 
pointed out that the data can be segmented into two clusters with the following 
characteristics: incidents which occurred in the piping system which usually released as 
liquid (spill) or incidents which occurred in the process vessel or ancillary equipment 
and released as vapor. Furthermore, the cluster members can be used in further 
analysis to produce more accurate results because of their homogeneous 
characteristics.  
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4.2.2 Association Rule Results  
The association rule method was performed using four variables that describe the 
chemicals released, equipment or area in the facility from where the chemical was 
released, the physical state of the chemical released and the type of industry where the 
incident occurred. The computation of the association rule was performed using data 
mining software, STATISTICA version 8.0 and which required the user to input 
predefined support and confidence values in order to generate the pattern. 
Table 5 shows the rules or patterns identified using the association rule method viewed 
from the perspective of the industry type where the incidents occurred. As can be 
observed in pattern numbers 4 through 6, the probability of incidents occurring in the 
chemical industry and also involving ancillary process equipment was calculated as 
0.072. The confidence of this pattern, ratio between the probability of incident and this 
particular set of attributes occurring to the probability of all incidents occurring in the 
chemical industry, was observed as 0.39. 
The other observed patterns include the probability of incidents occurring in the 
chemical industry which also involved process vessels and piping. The confidence 
values for both patterns were observed in the same value of 0.23. This means that the 
likelihood of chemical industry incidents involving process vessels is comparable to that 
of piping. 
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Table 5: Incident pattern in regard to the industry where the incidents occurred 
No. A B P (A∩B) P (B | A) 
1. Chemical industry Vapor release 0.15 0.85 
2. Petroleum refining Vapor release 0.078 0.94 
3. Plastics, synthetics, and resins Vapor release 0.063 0.89 
4. Chemical industry Ancillary process equipment 0.072 0.39 
5. Chemical industry Process vessel 0.041 0.23 
6. Chemical industry Piping 0.042 0.23 
7. Petroleum refining Ancillary process equipment 0.049 0.59 
8. Plastics, synthetics, and resins Process vessel 0.021 0.29 
9. Plastics, synthetics, and resins Ancillary process equipment 0.031 0.44 
 
Table 6 shows the incident pattern using variables that described the equipment 
involved and the type of release. The patterns are presented in the dependent 
probability format. The probability that ammonia could be released from piping was 
calculated at 0.16 and was the highest compared to similar piping incidents involving 
benzene and chlorine where the probability values were calculated at 0.052 and 0.057 
respectively.  
 
Table 6: Probability of incident B after incident involving equipment A occurred   
No. A B P (A∩B) P (B | A) P (A) 
1. Piping Chlorine 0.011 0.057 0.19 
2. Piping Benzene 0.01 0.052 0.19 
3. Piping Ammonia 0.031 0.16 0.19 
4. Ancillary equipment Benzene 0.013 0.041 0.32 
5. Ancillary equipment Ammonia 0.027 0.087 0.31 
6. Ancillary equipment Hydrogen sulfide 0.01 0.033 0.30 
7. Process vessel Vinyl chloride 0.012 0.068 0.18 
8. Storage above ground Ammonia 0.017 0.202 0.08 
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Table 7: Probability of incident B after release of A  
  
These probability values serve as the base condition to estimate the frequency of 
incident occurrences. In order to specify the probability values, a service factor that 
takes into account the frequency of use, bulk of containment, and other specific 
condition of the equipment can be applied. By observing the occurrences of similar 
attributes from the opposite perspective, as shown in Table 7, the lift values of piping 
incidents for different chemicals can be calculated.   
The lift values for piping and ancillary equipment are shown in Table 8. The lift value 
quantifies the probability of incident involving chemical Y to occur, given incident 
involving equipment X has occurred, in relative to the probability of incidents involving 
equipment X. Using the example from Table 8, it can be observed that the probability of 
an incident involving ammonia to occur, given a piping incident has occurred is 1.4 
times more higher in comparison to the probability of piping incidents.  
 
 
 
 
 
No. A B P (A∩B) P (B | A) P(A) 
1. Chlorine Piping 0.011 0.29 0.04 
2. Ammonia Piping 0.031 0.26 0.12 
3. Benzene Piping 0.01 0.25 0.04 
4. Benzene Ancillary process equipment 0.012 0.31 0.04 
5. Ammonia Ancillary process equipment 0.027 0.22 0.12 
6. Hydrogen sulfide Ancillary process equipment 0.01 0.46 0.02 
7. Vinyl chloride Process vessel 0.012 0.45 0.03 
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Table 8: Lift value for piping and ancillary equipment 
Chemicals 
Lift value 
Piping Ancillary equipment 
Ammonia 1.4 0.7 
Benzene 1.3 1.0 
Chlorine 1.5 n/a 
Hydrogen sulfide n/a 1.4 
 
The lift values in Table 8 were compared with the lift values obtained from previous 
research (Anand, 2005). Both of the current and previous studies used piping as the 
equipment variable, and the lift values found for three chemicals was compared. As 
shown in Table 9, there are slight discrepancies between the values obtained from the 
current research and the previous one. The discrepancies may come from the number 
of data that was taken into account in the analysis as well as the source of the data 
used. The previous research used the NRC data which was limited to Harris County 
data, while the current research was using the HSEES data from 14 states. This 
suggests that using lift values is limited to facilities or processes in that respective 
database.  
 
Table 9: Comparison of lift value for piping 
Chemicals 
Lift value for Piping 
Present research (Anand, 2005) 
Chlorine 1.5 2 
Ammonia 1.4 1.5 
Benzene 1.3 1 
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Dependent probabilities and lift values shown in Tables 5 through 8 can be used as 
probability inputs in preliminary risk assessments or in general decision making during 
industrial operations. These values are derived from historical records and provide the 
likelihood of incidents occurring. Although these values may not be directly applicable 
for all processes available in the process industry, they can be used to an extent by 
facilities that participated in the HSEES system. The dependent probabilities can also 
be used for updating the prior probability of events using observations recorded in the 
database and the Bayes Theorem. This application however is limited to particular 
events that the prior probability and the posterior probability were derived from. 
 
4.2.3 Classification and Regression Tree Results 
This section is a continuation of section 4.1.2, where the relationship between the 
predictor variables, such as release quantity and distance of victims in respect to the 
release source and the dependent variable of incident severity is further studied.  In 
determining the relationship, the first step is creating scatter plots using the variables of 
interest. The scatter plots exhibit the characteristics of the data and indicate which 
model is suitable for data fitting. As shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22, the scatter plots 
indicated that there was no obvious relationship between the variables. The repetitive 
values of the predictors and severity score exist because they were derived from 
categorical responses, where the middle point of the categorical response was used to 
represent the value of each respected variable.  
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Figure 21: Scatter plot of quantity of release with severity score 
 
 
Figure 22: Scatter plot of distance of victims in respect to source of release 
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Based on the scatter plots, the classification and regression tree (CRT) was selected to 
fit the incident data due to its ability to perform piecewise regressions. The regression 
function of the CRT is used to estimate the severity of the incident using predictor 
variables of release quantity and distance between victims and the source of release. 
Figure 23 shows the CRT which is used to describe a total of 1,152 process related 
incidents. The release quantity of 42,000 lbs was the critical release quantity, a point at 
which the tree started splitting into branches. Incidents having releases beyond this 
amount were estimated to have an average severity score of 57 (node 20), and in this 
case the distance between the victims and the source of release did not affect the 
average severity score.   
On the other hand, the severity of incidents with releases less than 42,000 lbs was 
affected by the distance of the victims to the source of release. If the distance of the 
victims to the source of release was less than 113 ft, then the average severity score 
was estimated at 14, otherwise it was estimated at 7. Following the split arrows, if the 
release quantity is less than 1.5 lbs then go left to node 1, which represents the 
incidents with estimated average severity score of 7.  For incidents with a release 
quantity of more than 1.5 lbs, go right to node where the average severity score was 
estimated at 15, and so on. Table 10 shows all of the nodes generated by the CRT and 
the values of the predictors and dependent variable.  
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From 13 of the 19 terminal nodes, it can be observed that there is a proportional 
relationship between the release quantity and the incidents‟ average severity score, and 
there is an inverse proportional relationship between the distances of the victims from 
the source of the release and the incidents‟ average severity score. These relationships 
are reasonable due to the fact that a higher quantity of chemical releases in the same 
space means a higher concentration and larger distance between victims and the 
source of the release and higher dilution effects, thus lower concentrations. 
Nodes 1-2 and 14-16 show that the increase in release quantity, given constant 
distance between the victims and the source of release, resulted in a higher average 
severity score. From nodes 3-4 and 10-11, it can be observed that the larger the 
distance between victims and the source of release, given the same release quantity, 
resulted in lower average severity score. Nodes 6-7 and nodes 8-9 are incidents with 
increasing release quantity and a constant distance between victims and the source of 
release. For each pairs of nodes 6-7 and 8-9, there is a proportional relationship 
between the release quantity and incidents‟ average severity score. However, if we look 
at nodes 6-9 as a continuous scheme, the proportional relationship does not apply 
anymore. This indicates that there may be other predictor variables which affect the 
incidents‟ severity, particularly for the incidents belonging to these nodes. Therefore, 
identifying and integrating the other significant predictors can improve the CRT results. 
  
  
 
Figure 23: CRT for chemical process related incidents  
Tree 1 graph for Severity score
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Table 10: CRT summary for chemical process related incidents 
First 
Splits 
Node 
Number of 
incidents (N) 
Release quantity (lbs) Distance (ft) 
Average severity 
score (Mu) 
Left  
1 112 Q ≤ 1.5 D ≤ 112.5 7 
2 38 Q ≤ 3.5 D ≤ 112.5 28 
3 90 3.5 < Q ≤ 12.5 D ≤ 17.5 13 
4 42 3.5 < Q ≤ 12.5 17.5 < D ≤ 52.5 10 
5 4 3.5 < Q ≤ 12.5 52.5 < D ≤ 112.5 20 
6 5 12.5 < Q ≤ 16.5 D ≤ 112.5 1 
7 15 16.5 < Q ≤ 21 D ≤ 112.5 26 
8 125 21 < Q ≤ 99.5 D ≤ 112.5 8 
9 54 99.5 < Q ≤ 102 D ≤ 112.5 33 
10 130 102 < Q ≤ 14,169 D ≤ 17.5 15 
11 103 102 < Q ≤ 14,169 17.5 < D ≤ 112.5 10 
12 9 14,169 < Q ≤ 42,018 D ≤ 112.5 37 
13 57 Q ≤ 90.5 D > 112.5 8 
14 124 90.5 < Q ≤ 178.5 D > 112.5 3 
15 76 178.5 < Q ≤ 537.5 D > 112.5 7 
16 64 537.5 < Q ≤ 6,846 D > 112.5 12 
17 32 6,846 < Q ≤ 14,623 D > 112.5 3 
18 52 14,623 < Q ≤ 42,018 D > 112.5 11 
Right 19 20 Q   42,018 - 57 
 
Then, the CRT was performed to more specific data that included 323 incidents where 
fires and explosions had occurred. Figure 24 shows the critical predictor for this tree 
was the release quantity of 33,746 lbs. For a release quantity above this amount, the 
average severity score of the incidents was estimated at 60, otherwise it was estimated 
at 16. Following the same principle as the previous CRT, this tree produced 20 terminal 
nodes which are summarized in Table 11.  
Nodes 1-2, 3-4, 8-9, 10-11 and 18-19 demonstrate the proportional relationship 
between the release quantity and the average severity score, given a constant distance 
between victims and the source of release. Nodes 12 and 13 have similar predictor 
variable values and therefore, similar values for the average severity score. Nodes 16-
17 show that within the same release quantity range, the severity score decreased as 
the distance between victims and the source of the release increased. 
  
 
Figure 24: CRT for fire and explosion incidents 
Tree 1 graph for Severity score
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ID=1 N=323
Mu=18.167802
Var=565.981812
ID=2 N=304
Mu=15.586184
Var=428.532770
ID=4 N=76
Mu=28.684211
Var=989.177909
ID=6 N=68
Mu=32.047059
Var=998.118668
ID=9 N=61
Mu=34.018033
Var=1018.265413
ID=11 N=52
Mu=31.021154
Var=866.592053
ID=12 N=43
Mu=26.118605
Var=531.841979
ID=15 N=35
Mu=28.571429
Var=526.530612
ID=5 N=228
Mu=11.220175
Var=165.402926
ID=18 N=37
Mu=17.870270
Var=534.710738
ID=19 N=191
Mu=9.931937
Var=83.635158
ID=23 N=159
Mu=10.965409
Var=89.275847
ID=25 N=127
Mu=9.389764
Var=36.336667
ID=26 N=114
Mu=8.697368
Var=10.417625
ID=28 N=104
Mu=9.177885
Var=7.151530
ID=30 N=82
Mu=9.396341
Var=5.611816
ID=32 N=52
Mu=9.048077
Var=8.517881
ID=34 N=51
Mu=9.223529
Var=7.084152
ID=37 N=47
Mu=9.157447
Var=7.631381
ID=8 N=7
Mu=14.871429
Var=493.699184
ID=10 N=9
Mu=51.333333
Var=1542.888889
ID=14 N=8
Mu=15.387500
Var=413.601094
ID=16 N=6
Mu=38.333333
Var=1080.555556
ID=17 N=29
Mu=26.551724
Var=388.109394
ID=13 N=9
Mu=54.444444
Var=1802.469136
ID=7 N=8
Mu=0.100000
Var=0.000000
ID=20 N=20
Mu=8.555000
Var=211.817475
ID=21 N=17
Mu=28.829412
Var=692.395017
ID=22 N=32
Mu=4.796875
Var=23.932178
ID=24 N=32
Mu=17.218750
Var=250.420898
ID=36 N=4
Mu=10.000000
Var=0.000000
ID=38 N=46
Mu=9.139130
Var=7.781512
ID=39 N=1
Mu=10.000000
Var=0.000000
ID=35 N=1
Mu=0.100000
Var=0.000000
ID=33 N=30
Mu=10.000000
Var=0.000000
ID=31 N=22
Mu=8.363636
Var=12.049587
ID=29 N=10
Mu=3.700000
Var=17.010000
ID=27 N=13
Mu=15.461538
Var=222.556213
ID=3 N=19
Mu=59.473684
Var=952.354571
Quantity of Release
<= 33746.000000 > 33746.000000
Quantity of Release
<= 102.000000 > 102.000000
Distance (ft)
<= 317.500000 > 317.500000
Quantity of Release
<= 1.500000 > 1.500000
Quantity of Release
<= 4.000000 > 4.000000
Distance (ft)
<= 52.500000 > 52.500000
Quantity of Release
<= 33.000000 > 33.000000
Quantity of Release
<= 75.000000 > 75.000000
Distance (ft)
<= 17.500000 > 17.500000
Quantity of Release
<= 233.000000 > 233.000000
Quantity of Release
<= 175.000000 > 175.000000
Quantity of Release
<= 1346.500000 > 1346.500000
Quantity of Release
<= 15112.000000 > 15112.000000
Quantity of Release
<= 9158.000000 > 9158.000000
Distance (ft)
<= 1270.000000 > 1270.000000
Distance (ft)
<= 112.500000 > 112.500000
Distance (ft)
<= 52.500000 > 52.500000
Quantity of Release
<= 2579.500000 > 2579.500000
Quantity of Release
<= 3643.000000 > 3643.000000
1
4
3
2
5
6
7
8 9 10
12
11
18
19
13 14
15
16
17
20
Red: Terminal nodes 
 
5
0
 
51 
 
 
Table 11: CRT summary for fire and explosion incidents 
First 
Splits 
Node 
Number of 
incidents (N) 
Release quantity (lbs) Distance (ft) 
Average severity 
score (Mu) 
Left  
1 7 Q ≤ 1.5 D ≤ 317.5 15 
2 9 1.5 < Q ≤ 4 D ≤ 317.5 51 
3 8 4 < Q ≤ 33 D ≤ 52.5 15 
4 6 33 < Q ≤ 75 D ≤ 52.5 38 
5 29 75 < Q ≤ 102 D ≤ 52.5 27 
6 9 4 < Q ≤ 102 52.5 < D ≤ 317.5 54 
7 8 - D   317.5 0.1 
8 20 102 < Q ≤ 233 D ≤ 17.5 9 
9 17 233 < Q ≤ 33,746 D ≤ 17.5 29 
10 32 Q ≤ 175 D > 17.5 5 
11 32 175 < Q ≤ 1,346.5 D > 17.5 17 
12 4 1, 346.5 < Q ≤ 2,579.5 D ≤ 52.5 10 
13 46 1,346.5 < Q ≤ 3,643  17.5 < D ≤ 52.5 9 
14 1 3,643 < Q ≤ 9,158 17.5 < D ≤ 52.5 10 
15 1 1,346.5 < Q ≤ 9,158 52.5 < D ≤ 112.5 0.1 
16 30 1,346.5 < Q ≤ 9,158 112.5 < D ≤ 1,270 10 
17 22 1,346.5 < Q ≤ 9,158 D > 1,270 8 
18 10 9,158 < Q ≤ 15,112 D > 17.5 4 
19 13 15,112 < Q ≤ 33,746 D > 17.5 15 
Right 20 19 Q   33,746 - 60 
 
Finally, the CRT was performed using 339 cases of ammonia incidents. Figure 25 
shows the CRT for the ammonia data, where the first partitioning of the data occurred at 
a distance of 53 ft. For incidents where the distance between the victims and the source 
of release was less than 53 ft, go left, otherwise go right. This CRT produced 23 
terminal nodes which represent the incident outcomes as shown in Table 12. Each 
node has incidents with frequency (N), and the analysis considered only nodes with N   
5. In general, it can be observed that the release quantity proportionally increases with 
the increase of severity score. Node 3-5, 6 and 8, 9-11, 15-16, and 17-18 show that the 
increase in release quantity resulted in the increase in the average of the severity score, 
given the distance of victims to the release was constant. The previous result justifies 
the positive relationship between release quantity and severity of incidents, which was 
assumed at the beginning.  
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Node 13 and 14 show that within the same range of release quantity of 2,283.5 < Q ≤ 
6,000 lbs, the average severity score of the incidents was similar in the value of 10 and 
9, respectively. The incident severity of node 14 was lower compared to that of node 13, 
because the distance between victims and source of release in node 14, 17.5 < D ≤ 
52.5 ft, was larger compared to the distance of node 13, D ≤ 17.5 ft. This justifies the 
inverse proportional relationship between the distance between victims and the source 
of release and the incidents‟ severity that was presumed. Other nodes did not show 
obvious relationships.  
The CRT was successfully used to describe the relationship between the predictor 
variables, release quantity and distance of victims from source of release, as well as the 
dependent variable, incident severity, in a semi-quantitative manner. There are cases, 
where the release quantity and distance between the victims and source of release 
alone were not enough to estimate the severity of the incidents. This indicates that there 
are other factors that need to be taken into account for as predictor variables in the 
analysis in order to estimate the severity of the incidents accurately.      
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 25: CRT for ammonia incidents 
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Table 12: CRT summary for ammonia incidents 
First 
Splits 
Node 
Number of 
incidents (N) 
Release quantity (lbs) Distance (ft) 
Average severity 
score (Mu) 
L
e
ft
 h
a
n
d
 
1 42 Q ≤ 0.5 D ≤ 17.5 13 
2 1 Q ≤ 0.5 17.5 < D ≤ 52.5 10 
3 14 0.5 ≤ Q ≤ 8.5 D ≤ 52.5 6 
4 34 8.5 < Q ≤ 16 D ≤ 52.5 12 
5 5 16 < Q ≤ 22.5 D ≤ 52.5 24 
6 18 22.5 < Q ≤ 52.5 D ≤ 52.5 3 
7 2 52.5 < Q ≤ 60.5 D ≤ 52.5 30 
8 19 60.5 < Q ≤ 99.5 D ≤ 52.5 11 
9 14 99.5 < Q ≤ 175 D ≤ 52.5 4 
10 27 175 < Q ≤ 251 D ≤ 52.5 7 
11 17 251 < Q ≤ 1,500 D ≤ 52.5  20 
12 1 1,500 < Q ≤ 2,283.5 D ≤ 52.5 1 
13 16 2,283.5 < Q ≤ 6,000 D ≤ 17.5 10 
14 24 2,283.5 < Q ≤ 6,000 17.5 < D ≤ 52.5 9 
15 7 6,000 < Q ≤ 22,500 D ≤ 52.5 6 
16 12 Q ≥ 22,500 D ≤ 52.5 11 
R
ig
h
t 
h
a
n
d
 
17 49 Q ≤ 7 D ≥ 52.5 6 
18 37 7 < Q ≤ 52.5 D ≥ 52.5 10 
19 15 52.5 < Q ≤ 5,900 52.5 < D ≤ 112.5 1 
20 34 52.5 < Q ≤ 5,900 D ≥ 112.5 5 
21 1 5,900 < Q ≤ 8,900 D ≥ 52.5 50 
22 19 8,900 < Q ≤ 22,500 D ≥ 52.5 10 
23 28 Q ≥ 22,500 D ≥ 52.5 9 
 
4.3 Text Mining Results  
Text mining was performed to analyze the HSEES comments variable. The data mining 
tools used to analyze the text mining results were feature selection and cluster analysis.   
 
4.3.1 Feature Selection Results: Predictor Variables  
The number of text documents used in the text mining process was 3,316 and the 
number of words selected was 181. The SVD process was performed using the inverse 
document frequency to reduce the initial 181 x 3,316 word-document matrix. The same 
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process resulted in 27 components of singular value. The scree plot visualizes the 
results of the SVD, as shown in Figure 26. The elbow of the plot is located after 
component 4. Thus, components 1 through 4 represent 20 % of the variance among the 
data. 
 
 
Figure 26: SVD scree plot 
 
Then the words were mapped in the reduced dimension as shown in Figures 27 through 
29. The groups of words that are distinguished from the large majority of words group 
are the words of importance and the proximity of the words on the plot represents their 
close relationships (Statsoft, 2008). 
From Figure 27, it can be observed that ammonia, valve, tank, leak, flare and line were 
the important words. Through the closeness of the words shown in this figure, it can be 
observed that whenever the word ammonia is mentioned, the report would also include 
the words leak, valve and tank. This implied that ammonia incidents reported to HSEES 
generally can be linked to a leaking valve or tank.  
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Figure 27: Scatter plot of component 1 and 2 
 
Flare, failure, power, compressor, reactor, maintenance and pressure were the other 
important words that are also imminent to one another. The grouping of these words is 
reasonable due to the fact that flaring is usually conducted to handle overpressure or 
equipment (compressor, reactor) failure.  
Figure 28 illustrates the scatter plot between components 3 and 4, where it shows that 
valve, pressure, leak, open, relief valve, cooling, heat exchanger, tube, leak, water and 
tower as the important words. The proximity of these words implies that there were 
significant amounts of incident reports of heat exchangers leaking in the tube side 
where water had leaked. The plot also revealed that there had been many reports of 
incidents where overpressure had occurred that led to the opening of a relief valve.  
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Figure 28: Scatter plot component 3 and 4 
 
The numeric indices obtained from the extracted word frequencies and SVD process 
now can be further analyzed using various data mining tools such as the feature 
selection tool. The feature selection tool is used to identify the best predictors for the 
words of interest (dependent variable) in predictive modeling.  
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Figures 29 through 38 show the 10 best predictors for selected dependent variables. 
The words trip, restart, shutdown, flare, refrigerant, control, and failure were the best 
predictors for the variable „compressor‟ as shown in Figure 29. Referring back to the 
incident description, it was evident that most compressor related incidents were caused 
by a trip or was shut down due to equipment failure or power outage. Then, the 
compressor line was isolated and sent to flare system. In many of the cases, the 
compressor was part of the refrigeration system, and this explained the presence of the 
word refrigerant.  
 
 
Figure 29: Importance plot using compressor as dependent variable 
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Figure 30 shows that seal, failure, isolate, discharge, maintenance, replace, stop, block, 
and water are the best descriptors for pump. In many of the reported incidents, seal 
failure was the prominent cause of pump failures. The word discharge referred to the 
failure (leaking or blocked) of a discharge line or chemical discharge. From the incident 
descriptions, it can be observed that these incidents often occurred during maintenance 
work. This can be used as an indication that the work procedure during maintenance 
needs to be evaluated. 
 
 
Figure 30: Importance plot using pump as dependent variable 
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As shown in Figure 31, the variable reactor was strongly related to the words 
temperature, high, shutdown, flare, vent, trip, active, upset, flow, and tank. Based on the 
incident descriptions, the reactor-related incidents are often due to high temperatures in 
the reactor that leads to shutting down the system, venting the chemical, or isolating the 
reactor system. It can also be observed from the plot that there were several instances 
where the word „reactor‟ was present, and words such as trip, process upset, overflow 
or tank were also present. 
 
 
Figure 31: Importance plot using reactor as dependent variable 
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Figure 32 shows the best predictors for the word „boiler‟. The details of HSEES reports 
confirmed that the boiler-related incidents were often initiated by trips which then 
caused a steam pressure swing and fuel gas to be vented. The faulty switches on boiler 
levels were reported several times as the cause of the trip.  
 
 
Figure 32: Importance plot using boiler as dependent variable 
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Figure 33 shows that the words trip, vent, stack, loss, feed, malfunction, hydrogen, leak, 
active and gas were the best descriptors when incinerator is the dependent variable. 
The reported mode of incinerator failures was trip, which resulted in the incidental 
release of stack gas to the atmosphere. Incinerator malfunctions were described as 
another mode of incinerator failure. 
 
 
Figure 33: Importance plot using incinerator as dependent variable 
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As shown in Figure 34, the word pipe had descriptor words such as hole, leak, broke, 
crack, fit, evacuation, victim, soil, chlorine, and flange. The incident descriptions 
revealed that the pipe-related incidents were usually due to a leak through a hole, crack 
or break in the pipeline. Some of these pipe failure modes resulted from corrosion 
problems and occurred during maintenance activities. Several incidents also reported 
the release of chlorinated water from the pipe, evacuation as a consequence of the 
chemical release, and maintenance as the company response to the leak. 
 
 
Figure 34: Importance plot using pipe as dependent variable 
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Figure 35 shows that the word gasket can be predicted using words such as flange, 
blew, fail, rupture, transfer, vapor, line, reactor, and detect. The incident descriptions 
showed that the incidents mentioning gasket were highly related to flanges on pipelines 
and many times the gasket on the flanges failed (ruptured) and blew away. Other 
significant gasket incident reports involved failure of gaskets in the manways of the 
reactors.  
 
 
Figure 35: Importance plot using gasket as dependent variable 
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The word fit pointed out in Figure 36 refers to the fitting of pipes. As can be observed, 
the words crack, repair, pipe, tube, leak, ammonia, hose, block, broke, pump were 
among the best predictors for incidents related to fitting. The common failure modes for 
these incidents were crack and loose fittings which led to chemical leak. Ammonia in 
particular was frequently reported in incidents related to fittings leak. 
 
 
Figure 36: Importance plot using fit or fitting as dependent variable 
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As shown in Figure 37, the word hose was strongly related to the word nurse, which 
referred to nurse tanks. The nurse tanks were often reported to store ammonia. The 
word transfer was also common due to the transfer of fluids using a hose, e.g., from a 
tank to a truck.   
 
 
Figure 37: Importance plot using hose as dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Importance plot
Dependent variable:
hose
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Importance (F-value)
releases
acid
fil l
truck
ammonia
rupture
tank
broke
transfer
nurse
67 
 
 
 
Figure 38 shows the importance plot using ammonia as the dependent variable. 
Whenever ammonia was reported, the incident description would also include the word 
smell, referring to the pungent odor of ammonia. The ammonia-related incidents 
reported to HSEES commonly related to refrigeration systems, which explained the high 
F-values of the word „refrigerant‟. From the plot, it can also be assumed that a 
significant number of ammonia incidents resulted in evacuation of the nearby 
population. 
 
 
Figure 38: Importance plot using ammonia as dependent variable 
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The previous figures describe the usefulness of importance plots where one can get the 
significant predictor variables of a particular word or variable of interest. Furthermore, 
these predictors can be used in predictive modeling for the dependent variable. The 
predictor words were identified based on their relative frequencies and importance in 
the incident documents. Using the predictor words, scenarios of incidents with different 
types of failure modes can be developed. Incident scenarios can be used for many 
purposes, such as inputs for process hazard analysis (PHA), quantitative risk 
assessments (QRA), etc. In order to have a comprehensive view of the incident 
scenarios, they have to be developed and structured to emulate the actual events. The 
current variables in HSEES may not provide all the necessary elements to build detailed 
incident scenarios.  
Several recommendations can be proposed to improve the quality of the data and 
information contained in the database. This will be further discussed in section 4.4. 
Overall, this section demonstrated the application of text mining to the HSEES text 
variable. The text mining results captured the information contained in the incident 
database. The findings from text mining analysis not only were aligned with the findings 
from the statistical analysis but also provided more details, which added more value to 
the analysis. 
 
4.3.2 Cluster Analysis with Text Inputs Results 
Cluster analysis was performed using words and document components obtained from 
the SVD process. The numbers of clusters were assigned so that the members of each 
cluster provided a meaningful group of words that can be used as elements to describe 
the incidents. The text data was segmented into 3 clusters and the profiles of the 3 
clusters were evaluated for meaningful groupings. If these clusters did not provide 
meanings, the process was iterated until meaningful groups were found. The final 
attempt was grouping the data into 8 clusters. Finally, after observing and evaluating 
the profiles of the clustering, the incident data with 6 clusters provided the most 
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meaningful clusters. The characterizing words of each cluster are shown in Table 13 
and the succinct descriptions of the clusters are shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 13: Cluster analysis using text inputs 
Cluster % Characterizing words 
1 4.4 Cool, heat exchanger, isolate, leak, tower, tube, water 
2 2.8 Ammonia, open, pressure, tank, valve 
3 3.9 Chlorine, evacuate, facility, fire, pipe, spill, storage 
4 12.1 
Air, compressor, control, equipment failure, flare, gas, high, line, 
maintenance, occur, power, process, pump, reactor, repair, secure, 
shutdown, vent 
5 20.4 
Anhydrous, block, change, close, column, condense, drum, excess, 
flow, high, indicate, isolate, level, left, liquid, malfunction, monitor, 
nurse, overpressure, product, refrigerant, releases, relief valve, relieve, 
rupture, safety valve, steam, stop, temperature, trip, upset, vapor, 
vessel 
6 56.4 
Acid, active, bag, blew, boiler, broke, broken, burner, chemical, clean, 
condition, contractor, crack, cylinder, detect, discharge, drain, electric, 
emergency, employees, enter, error, evacuation, faulty, feed, fill, fire 
department, fit, flange, freon, hole, hose, hydrogen, incinerator, injury, 
inside, intent, investigate, laboratory, load, located, loss, material, 
mercury, odor, old, outage, outside, oxide, pipeline, place, plan, plug, 
possible, problem, receive, reduction, remove, replace, resident, 
restart, roof, room, scene, scrubber, seal, service, severe, sewer, site, 
smell, soil, stack, start up, storm, taken, thermal, transfer, treatment, 
truck, victim, waste 
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Table 14: Clusters descriptions 
No. Cluster Description 
1 Heat exchanger related incidents: leak as the common mode of failure, particularly in the 
tube side; water as prominent leaking agent; isolation of the equipment was the facility 
response. 
2 Ammonia incidents included scenarios where pressure built up due to improper filling of 
the tanks, full or partial opening of the valve caused chemical release during operation 
3 Chlorine incidents where it spilled from pipes or was released from storage tank causing 
facility-wide evacuations. 
4 Incidents due to equipment failure: compressor incidents due to malfunctioning control 
valve or power trip, high pressure or temperature of the reactor resulted in releasing gas 
(chemical) through flare, reactor upset led to shutdown and the chemical released through 
flare, pump failure, maintenance as the facility response, etc 
5 Condenser incidents where a leak was detected as cause of loss of containment, 
incidents related to condensation: cold temperature condensed moisture in airline, 
excessively high temperatures, leaks which released refrigerant, high level in the 
compressor drum tripping the equipment caused by malfunctioning instrumentation. 
Incident involving blocked flow, high level that led to overpressure, activation of relief 
valve. Incident occurred while performing change in the equipment: unexpected residual 
released to the environment. Nurse tank incidents: a temperature change influenced 
pressurization of the tank causing valve to open. Tank or line rupture due to overpressure, 
puncture or thermal shock or safety disk rupture due to overpressure. Steam was used to 
dilute emission at the flare, air monitoring due to chemical release, anhydrous ammonia 
leaked due to valve failure. 
6 Incidents related to thermal oxidizer, boiler, incinerator, scrubber, chlorine reduction 
burner, plug, pipeline, drain, transfer hose or line and flange failure. The equipment blew, 
broke, cracked, or leaked through holes and resulted in loss of containment. The failure 
resulted from electrical problems such as power outage or damaged electrical box. 
Chemical discharged in these types of incidents were hydrogen, freon, mercury, oxide, 
and acids. Most of the equipment involved in the incidents was restarted to continue 
operation. Most of the releases occurred during planned activities such as equipment start 
up, cleaning and maintenance. The incidents in this cluster also cover releases that went 
to the storm sewer system. 
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Cluster 1 contains group of words which implies incidents involving heat exchangers, as 
shown in Table 14. Referring to the incident descriptions, generally the heat exchangers 
experienced failure due to a leak particularly in the tube side of the equipment. Water 
was reported as the prominent leaking agent in this incident group and facilities 
performed isolation of the equipment as a response to the incidents. 
Cluster 2 contains group of words that describe incidents related to ammonia releases. 
The possible scenarios that can be derived from this importance plot are ammonia 
releases from tanks due to overpressure or ammonia release from an accidentally 
opened valve. More detailed scenarios of ammonia incidents included pressure built up 
due to improper filling of the tanks and full or partial opening of the valve causing 
release during operation. 
Cluster 3 is characterized mostly by chlorine incidents where it spilled from storage 
tanks or leaked from pipelines. Due to its toxicity, many of the incidents resulted in a 
facility wide evacuation. The word fire in cluster 3 was considered peculiar because 
chlorine does not pose a fire hazard. Referring back to the incident descriptions, the 
word fire actually referred to phrases such as fire department or fire fighters. This 
indicates that the synonyms and phrases list needs to be edited to capture this phrase.  
Cluster 4 covers incidents which were primarily related to compressor, reactor, and 
pump failures. Control valve malfunctions and power trips were reported as common 
precursors in compressors incidents. Instrumentation malfunctions resulted in high 
levels of liquid in the compressor drum that subsequently tripped the compressor. The 
reactor incidents usually resulted from high pressures or temperatures, where the gases 
(chemicals) were released through flares. The pump failure usually linked to seal failure, 
which allowed the chemical to leak to the environment. Maintenance implied 
maintenance work activities as the facilities‟ response to the incidents.  
Cluster 5 consists of incidents related to condensers and vessels containing liquid in 
particular nurse tanks. For all this equipment, leaks were detected as the major cause 
of loss of containment events. Reported condenser incidents included loss of cooling 
water in the condenser overheads, causing excessive temperature and pressure 
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increases, and leaks in the flanges or tube sides, releasing refrigerants to the 
environment.  
Nurse tank incident descriptions stated that drastic changes in temperature influenced 
the pressurization of the tank and triggered the activation of the relief valve. Other types 
of vessels and lines experienced ruptures due to overpressure, puncture, or thermal 
shock. Overpressure was a consequence of either blocked flow or high liquid levels in 
the vessels. This cluster also includes incidents where cold temperature was reported 
as the one of the contributing factors to failure due to line freezing and the condensation 
of air moisture in the airline.  
Cluster 5 also covers incidents that occurred while performing changes to the 
equipment. Releases occurred when residuals of the chemicals were not completely 
discharged or purged from the system. In order to reduce the concentration of the 
chemical, steam was used as a diluting agent at the flare and the air was monitored. 
Cluster 6 contains various incidents that do not belong in other clusters; hence it is 
comprised of incidents with different characteristics. Included in this cluster are 
incidents involving process units and parts, such as thermal oxidizers, boilers, 
incinerators, scrubbers, chlorine reduction burners, plugs, pipelines, drains, transfer 
hoses or lines and flanges. The equipment blew, broke, cracked, or leaked causing a 
loss of containment. Electrical problems such as power outages and electrical breaker 
failures were reported as precursors to the equipment failures.  
Chemicals that were discharged in significant numbers were hydrogen, freon, mercury, 
oxide, and acids. Most of the chemicals discharge occurred during a planned activity 
such as equipment start up, cleaning and maintenance. The incidents in this cluster 
also cover chemical discharges that ran off into the storm sewer system.  
In comparison with the cluster analysis that used structured data from section 4.2.1, the 
cluster analysis that used text inputs gave far more meaningful results because it 
contained words that can be structured to form incident elements and descriptions. The 
cluster that used text inputs showed a number of typical scenarios which also validates 
the cluster results. The present analysis coincides with the typical scenarios occurring in 
73 
 
 
 
the industry, and it can also be developed to identify rare incident scenarios where 
information is still limited. 
 
4.4 Recommendation for Chemical Incident Databases 
The HSEES chemical incident database is an example of the benefits and versatility of 
a chemical incident database. The previous HSEES database contained numerous 
variables that were applicable to process safety analysis. However, some analysis was 
limited by the information available from HSEES. For example, the equipment, chemical 
and industry type patterns generated using the association rules are still relatively 
general. There are two improvements that can be made, 1) to include more informative 
variables such as variables that describe the process units pertinent to the incidents 
and 2) to organize the variables and their attributes into taxonomy suitable to process 
safety.  
The process unit information should characterize the type of process held in the vicinity 
where the loss of containment had occurred. For example, an incident occurred in a 
fertilizer plant where process vessels and ammonia were reported as equipment 
involved in the chemical release. Instead of reporting the previous variables, which were 
the existing variables used by HSEES, it would be more informative to report that the 
incident had occurred in an ammonia refrigeration unit of the fertilizer plant.  
Chemical incident database users, especially those with process safety backgrounds, 
can create relevant associations with the process conditions, standard supporting 
equipment used in the processes, the relative locations of the process units in the 
facilities (e.g., downstream or upstream of a reactor), utilities complementing the 
process units. This type of information will create more possibilities for utilization of the 
incident reports. The variables should also be organized and structured using a 
taxonomy tailored to process safety so that the users have a common understanding of 
the incidents. The Mary Kay O‟Connor Process Safety Center is currently working on 
developing a process safety taxonomy which can be applied to incident database 
systems. 
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The prominent incident structure in the industry is the Barrier model. This model 
structures the incident by initiating events, protection barriers and subsequent events or 
consequence. The possible initiating events turn into process deviation if the control 
systems of the prevention barrier fail. Subsequently, if process deviation continues, loss 
of control leads to incidents (Markowski, 2006). The application of incident taxonomy 
and structured incident scenarios can improve the database significantly and diversify 
the potential use of chemical incident databases.   
Gathering information on the time duration of the incidents which then can be translated 
into the length of exposure to the victims would be very useful. As mentioned, the 
adverse effects of chemical exposure to human health should be analyzed based on the 
combination effect of concentration and length of exposure. The text entries in HSEES 
can be designed so that the reporters can provide brief descriptions of the incidents in a 
structured manner. This can be accomplished by creating list of questions for the 
HSEES data collection form that ensures desired information about the incidents are 
covered in the text descriptions.   
Furthermore, the analysis of data can be only as good as the quality and the quantity of 
data itself and because of that, the collection of incident data should be performed so 
that all required fields are filled properly. The current HSEES data has relatively 
adequate variables for analysis however there are many missing or blank fields. 
Improvement on the follow-up actions on the incident reporting is essential in order to 
complete the data and to generate comprehensive analysis. The incident collection 
system should invest time, effort and money to ensure that proper and required 
information are provided for each reported incident.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1 Conclusions  
The analysis of the HSEES chemical incident database has been performed using 
statistical means, data, and text mining. The results shown in this research prove that 
data and text mining methodologies are powerful ways to process large data and to 
obtain valuable information from it. Data mining exhibits potential for analyzing data 
describing the severity of injuries or fatalities that were experienced by victims. Text 
mining shows great potential for analyzing incident scenarios and possible severity 
information, given the required data is provided. Several conclusions can be drawn from 
this research: 
 Trend analysis provided an overall picture of the HSEES chemical incident data 
from 2002-2006 and served as a reference to guide the data and text mining 
analysis. The trend analysis results indicate that the number of incidents 
increased, as well as the number of injuries caused by those incidents. The 
most prominent type of release and contributing cause were vapor release and 
equipment failure, respectively. Among frequently released chemicals are 
ammonia and chlorine.  The chemicals were released primarily in the quantity 
category of 100 > Q ≥ 1,000 lbs. 
 Cluster analysis using structured data did not produce discernable clusters. 
Clustering using text inputs produced meaningful groups of incidents. 
 The relationship between the release quantity, distance between the victims and 
the location of the source of release, and the severity of the incident can be 
evaluated using classification and regression trees. The analysis shows that the 
relationship between release quantity and distance between the victims and the 
source of release were proportional and inversely proportional to the severity of 
the incidents, respectively. However, in several cases, the relationships did not 
apply because there were more factors that affected the severity of the 
incidents. 
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 The association rule produced probability values of incidents involving particular 
equipment and chemicals; piping and ancillary equipment, and ammonia, 
chlorine, benzene and hydrogen sulfide, respectively. The two lift values 
produced were lower than the lift values produced from previous research.  
 Text mining was performed to identify typical scenarios that were reported to the 
HSEES chemical incident database. The scenarios were built using feature 
selection tools and cluster analysis.     
Data and text mining shows that there is more that can be done with chemical incident 
data than trend analysis. The quality and extent of the analysis strongly depends on the 
depth and the accuracy of the data. Therefore, there is much to be improved on the 
existing chemical incident data collection system in order to obtain desired information 
needed by the process industry. This research has also pointed out several areas for 
improving the chemical incident database, which focused on gathering data that has in-
depth information. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for Future Work  
There are many areas of this research that can be improved further. The cluster 
analysis using response variables can be performed using more variables in order to 
include more characteristics of the incidents. The association rules can be performed 
further by segmenting the incident data based on the type of industry as well as the 
process involved in the incident, so the resulting probability and lift values become more 
specific. The classification and regression tree analysis can be enhanced by taking into 
account the type of equipment that was involved in the incidents. This information can 
be retrieved from the text variable. The data can be also segmented based on type of 
the release and the type of chemicals released in order to get a more detailed 
description of the incident pathways.     
The start words list of the text mining can be edited to contain the words describing the 
cause of incidents (e.g., gasket, tank, overpressure, corrosion), safety barriers which 
failed during the incidents (e.g., safety interlock failure, alarm malfunctions), and the 
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consequence of incidents (e.g., fire, explosion, relief, flare). The text variables can also 
be joined with the categorical variables in order to capture more information from the 
database.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Stop words list 
event 
notification 
release 
report 
small 
unit 
workers 
Q20 
Q60 
Q65 
unknown 
call 
caller 
area 
atmosphere 
build 
one  
found 
time 
respond 
went 
time 
cause 
 nrc 
released 
per 
due 
company 
system 
result 
plant 
response 
phone  
caused 
had 
material 
lbs 
employee 
personnel 
people 
home 
school 
incident 
oper 
equip 
causes 
prp 
 
came 
allow 
hospital 
locate 
minute 
contain 
do 
provide 
quantity 
inform 
back 
made 
put 
go 
will 
work 
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Phrases and synonyms 
 
equipment failure 
shut down 
start up 
relief valve 
safety valve 
control valve 
float valve 
loose fit 
upset 
process vessel 
heat exchanger 
operating condition 
back pressure 
pressure wave 
water curtain 
natural gas 
work permit 
 
 
boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion 
permit to work 
personal protective equipment 
personal protective gear 
distributed control system 
rail tank 
fire fighter 
fire water 
fire department 
runaway reaction 
flammable vapor 
flexible hose 
gas cloud 
ignition source 
transfer tank 
waste water 
vapor cloud 
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Extracted words from text mining process 
 
Word-i Word Count 
1 Leak 712 
2 Valve 560 
3 Tank 466 
4 Line 392 
5 Ammonia 343 
6 Failure 338 
7 Flare 329 
8 Process 285 
9 Air 278 
10 Pressure 278 
11 Maintenance 276 
12 Repair 232 
13 Causing 229 
14 Spill 227 
15 Fail 223 
16 Fire 222 
17 Water 217 
18 Vent 210 
19 Compressor 206 
20 Chlorine 194 
21 Shutdown 191 
22 Pump 181 
23 Pipe 179 
24 Facility 179 
25 Secure 175 
26 Open 172 
27 Power 166 
28 Occur 165 
29 Gas 158 
30 Equipment failure 156 
31 Shut down 149 
32 Reactor 137 
33 Storage 128 
34 Shut 127 
35 Evacuate 126 
36 Relief valve 120 
37 Control 120 
38 Malfunction 107 
39 Trip 105 
40 High 104 
41 Chemical 104 
42 Close 100 
43 Refrigerant 100 
44 Upset 99 
45 Product 98 
46 Cool 98 
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47 Clean 97 
48 Start 96 
49 Discovered 95 
50 Releases 94 
51 Broke 92 
52 Oxide 91 
53 Vapor 86 
54 Seal 85 
55 Mercury 83 
56 Tower 82 
57 Rupture 80 
58 Tube 79 
59 Plan 78 
60 Site 78 
61 Remove 78 
62 Problem 77 
63 Isolate 75 
64 Use 75 
65 Receive 75 
66 Stop 73 
67 Two 73 
68 Ground 72 
69 Exchange 71 
70 Level  70 
71 Left  68 
72 Cylinder 68 
73 Stack 68 
74 Employees 656 
75 Startup 65 
76 Electric 65 
77 Error 65 
78 Drum 65 
79 Fd 64 
80 Hose 64 
81 Pound 64 
82 Nurse 63 
83 Acid 62 
84 Loss 61 
85 Estimate 61 
86 Boiler 61 
87 Steam 60 
88 Developed 60 
89 Bag 60 
90 Hour 59 
91 Gasket 59 
92 State 58 
93 Inside 58 
94 Thermal 58 
95 Liquid 57 
96 Amount 57 
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97 Monitor 57 
98 Block 56 
99 Heat 55 
100 Overpressure 55 
101 Relief 55 
102 Room 54 
103 Lift 54 
104 Hazmat 54 
105 Roof 53 
106 Feed 53 
107 Onto 53 
108 Scrubber 53 
109 Emission 53 
110 Load 53 
111 Transfer 53 
112 Crack 52 
113 Temperature 52 
114 Sewer 51 
115 Freon 51 
116 Flow 50 
117 Safety 50 
118 Column 50 
119 Evac 49 
120 Incinerator 49 
121 Condense 49 
122 Vessel 49 
123 Materi 49 
124 Hole 48 
125 Fit 48 
126 Day 48 
127 Treatment 48 
128 Waste 47 
129 Enter 47 
130 Lab 47 
131 Discharge 46 
132 Anhydrous 45 
133 Outside 45 
134 Blew 45 
135 Truck 44 
136 Plug 44 
137 Service 44 
138 Taken 43 
139 Change 43 
140 Pipeline 43 
141 Drain 43 
142 Injury 43 
143 Contractor 43 
144 Burner 43 
145 Flange 42 
146 Emerge 42 
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147 Investigate 42 
148 Severe 42 
149 Intent 42 
150 Fill 41 
151 Indicate 41 
152 Outage 41 
153 Safety valve 41 
154 Vict 41 
155 Resident 40 
156 Lost 40 
157 Storm 39 
158 Replace 39 
159 Condition 39 
160 Odor 39 
161 Active 39 
162 Located 39 
163 Place 39 
164 Faulty 39 
165 Scene 38 
166 Fire department 38 
167 Excess 38 
168 Relieve 38 
169 Hydrogen 37 
170 Notice 37 
171 Possible 37 
172 Heat Exchanger 37 
173 Restart 37 
174 Old 36 
175 Start up 35 
176 Reduction 35 
177 Broken 35 
178 Smell 34 
179 Human  34 
180 Detect 34 
181 … … 
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